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ABSTRACT
The building industry has in recent years seen huge costs incurred 
due to disputes arising on notice requirement clauses. These 
claims could have been averted if the parties had been diligent in 
providing the necessary notices. This article sets out to explore 
the law briefl y as interpreted by the courts in common law and 
equity and discuss the possibility of defence under the principle of 
promissory estoppel. More importantly it also shares the author’s 
view on how such pitfalls could have been prevented by giving 
the proper notices within the timeline required by the contract 
conditions. It cannot be emphasised enough that contractors 
would be wise to comply strictly with the notice provisions in the 
contract instead of relying on the estoppel principle or waiver or 
unconscionability to save their day. Notice clauses essentially 
require a competent contracts administrator to follow the time line 
provided in the contract conditions and would be most effective if 
the project team worked closely with the contracts administrator 
to ensure that proper notices are given when directions or 
instructions are received. Although it is common to see notice 
clauses which make it a condition precedent for a contractor to be 
entitled to claim for an extension of time or loss and expense claim 
being interpreted restrictively, in any litigation or arbitration it is 
always diffi cult to predict how the courts or tribunal would be willing 
to uphold such notice clause. It is therefore in the interest of the 
parties that notice clauses should be properly observed. Suffi ce 
to say, failure to comply with a notice clause and time bar may be 
fatal to a claim.
Keywords:  extensions of time, liquidated damages, condition 
precedent, estoppel, unconscionability, building contracts.
INTRODUCTION
The effect of time stipulations and time limitation clauses in 
construction contracts have traditionally been interpreted by the 
courts of common law and equity differently.
At common law, time stipulations have been usually treated as 
essential terms and a failure to meet a due date will give the 
innocent party the right to terminate the agreement and to recover 
damages. As a result, time was considered to be “of the essence” 
of the contract, unless expressly agreed to the contrary. 
The courts of equity however adopted a more liberal view of time 
stipulations making a distinction between “form and substance” 
and adopting the general rule that “performance on time was not 
essential if the substance of the contract could be carried out and 
the promisee adequately compensated for loss or damage caused 
by the promisor’s breach” [1]. However, time could be made of 
the essence where it had been unequivocally agreed [2] or could 
reasonably be implied in the circumstances.
Today, equity prevails and time will only be of the essence where it 
has been expressly agreed or where it may be implied.
Where time is not expressly made of the essence, it will be a 
matter of construction to determine whether the contract indicates 
an implied agreement that time is to be a condition [3]. When 
making such an assessment, courts will usually consider factors 
such as:
1. the form of words used;
2. the circumstances surrounding the contract;
3. the nature of the subject matter [4];
4. whether the contract is commercial in character;
5. the relationship between various terms in the contract; and
6. the nature of the obligation to which the time stipulation 
applies.
In relation to the form of words used, courts tend to adopt a 
hierarchical approach. Phrases such as “proceed with all due 
dispatch” [5], “on or about”, “within a reasonable time” or “as soon 
as possible” [6] imply that the parties did not intend to make time 
of the essence. By comparison, expressions such as “at the latest 
by” [7] or “within a number of days” would imply that the parties did 
intend to make time to be of the essence.
COMMON PHRASES IN TIME LIMITATION CLAUSES
A REASONABLE TIME
A “reasonable time” was considered by the House of Lords in 
the case of Stickney v Keeble [8], which involves the question of 
whether a period of notice was reasonable. In this case, although 
time fi xed for completion on the sale of land was not made the 
essence of the contract, it was held that the purchaser could 
nevertheless serve upon the vendor a notice limiting a time at the 
expiration of which he will treat the contract at an end. 
A reasonable time means a reasonable time under ordinary 
circumstances, and in the absence of some stipulation altering 
the implied contract between the parties the vendors would not 
be relieved from the consequences of fortuitous or unforeseen 
impediments affecting only the due performance by them of their 
part of the contract [9].
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE
When used in contract these words, “as soon as possible” mean 
that an act promised will be done within a reasonable time and 
undertake that it will be done in the shortest practicable time 
[10]. In determining what is commercially possible, the courts will 
usually consider the surrounding circumstances, even though 
the limited resources of the contracting may not be relevant. 
Consequently, it would be advisable that a party to a contract 
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should hesitate before undertaking to do something “as soon as 
possible”.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VARIOUS TERMS AND LIQUIDATED 
DAMAGES
The relationship between various terms in a contract is 
demonstrated by the case of Lamprell v Guardians of the Poor 
of the Billericay Union [11] where it was held that stipulations as 
to time should rarely be implied as essential in contracts which 
provide for payment of liquidated damages for failing to complete 
by the due date. In that case, the fact that the contract otherwise 
provided a mechanism for compensating the principal by way of 
liquidated damages was indicative that the parties did not intend 
time to be of the essence. 
The payment of liquidated damages is also seen as a mechanism 
that prevents time becoming at large to the contracting parties. In 
the English case of Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v McKinney 
Foundations Ltd [12] it was held that where an employer delayed 
the contractor and there was no provision in the contract for an 
extension of time to cover the employer’s delay, the employer 
could no longer insist on completion by the original completion 
date. The contractor would accordingly be only required to 
complete within a reasonable time.
TIME LIMITATION CLAUSES IN CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACTS
Since construction projects inevitably involve a number of activities 
that are dependent and interconnected on internal and external 
factors to the project, construction contracts generally do not state 
expressly that time is of the essence.
In addition, even if one clause states that time is of the essence, 
this does not necessarily mean that it is a condition of the contract 
that time for performance of all other terms is also of the essence 
[13]. 
Consequently, it will be a matter of construction as to whether 
time is of the essence in a building contract. Typically, unless the 
parties explicitly state that time is of the essence or it is reasonable 
to imply that that was the parties’ intention, performance on time 
will be a warranty rather than a condition. However, even where 
time is a condition, it may be a condition only in relation to certain 
obligations under the agreement – such as the provision of notices.
Since the English case of Hong Kong Fir Shipping Ltd v Kawasaki 
Kisen Kaisha Limited [14] where Diplock LJ (at pp.69-70) 
emphasised that a contract may stand somewhere between a 
condition and a warranty was classifi ed as an intermediate or 
innominate term which is capable of operating according to the 
gravity of the breach as either a condition or warranty. The courts 
in Australia and Singapore since Hong Kong Fir have recognised 
this term in their judgments [15].
INTERPRETATION OF TIME LIMITATION CLAUSES
Time limitation clauses originate from exclusion clauses and 
accordingly, they operate for the benefi t of one party [16] and 
they qualify a party’s rights or remedies by subjecting them to a 
specifi ed procedure.
In Sydney Corp v West [17] it was held that the meaning of an 
exclusion clause is to be determined by the intention of the parties 
as evidenced by the terms of the contract and, as a consequence, 
a number of rules of construction have developed over time [18].
One such rule is the contra proferentum rule which states that an 
exclusion clause may be construed strictly against the party for 
whose benefi t it is intended to operate.
The case of Tropicon Contractors Pte Ltd v Lojan Properties 
Pte Ltd [19] demonstrates the interpretation given to a time 
limitation clause. The case focuses on the project architect issuing 
a whole new set of seventeen interim certifi cates disallowing 
previously granted extensions of time on the ground of failure by 
the contractor to give the initial notices in time, and theoretically 
deducting sums by way of liquidated damages in those new 
certifi cates, while also issuing a delay certifi cate and a new general 
monetary certifi cate showing a net sum due to the employer after 
allowing for the resulting liquidated damages. The contractors 
had issued a writ and applied for summary judgment claiming the 
outstanding sums under twelve unpaid interim certifi cates [20].
It was held by LP Thean J [as he then was], and this was upheld 
by the Court of Appeal, that the delay certifi cate was not valid 
because it was not issued at the time stipulated in clause 24.1, 
i.e. “as soon as the latest date” for completion had passed. The 
learned judge also found that the purported revised extension 
of time was defective because it was not made within the time 
provided by clause 23.3; the delaying factor had occurred more 
than three years before and presumably had ceased to operate 
long before the purported extension.
CONDITION PRECEDENT
A time limitation clause in a building construction contract may be 
construed to be a condition precedent when a time limit is imposed 
on an act to be performed by one of the parties. 
The distinction between a “condition precedent to a contract” 
and a “condition precedent to an obligation” [21] is that in the 
former case, the specifi ed event occurs prior to the formation of a 
contract. Therefore, if the event fails to occur, the non-performing 
party cannot be said to have breached the contract. In the latter 
case, the specifi ed event occurs while a contract is still on foot. In 
this situation, a failure to perform may give rise to damages or act 
as a bar to other contractual provisions.
There have been a number of cases which have looked at whether 
time procedures in building construction contracts constitute 
a condition precedent to a claim. In this context, the condition 
precedent does not relate to the existence of the contract itself but 
rather to an obligation. This has the result that the specifi ed event 
may be waived by the party for whom the obligation was designed 
to benefi t.
One such case is Assoland Construction Pte Ltd v Malayan Credit 
Properties Pte Ltd [22]. Assoland entered into a main contract with 
Malayan Credit for the construction of “the Abelia”, a 12-storey 
apartment building with a basement car park using the 1987 
revised version of the standard form of contract of the Singapore 
Institute of Architects (“SIA Conditions”). The contract was 
scheduled for completion on 19 September 1991 but remained 
incomplete as of that date. Assoland made applications to the 
architect pursuant to clause 23.2 of the SIA Conditions. Clause 
23.2 reads:
It shall be a condition precedent to an extension of time by 
the architect under any provision of this Contract including 
the present clause (unless the architect has already 
informed the Contractor of his willingness to grant extension 
of time) that the Contractor shall within 28 days notify the 
architect in writing of any event or direction or instruction 
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which he consider entitles him to an extension of time, 
together with a short statement of the reasons why delay 
to completion will result. Upon receipt of such notifi cation 
the architect shall inform the Contractor in writing within 1 
month of its receipt whether or not he considers the event or 
instruction or direction in principle entitles the Contractor to 
an extension of time. (Emphasis added)
The architect did not respond to the notices given by Assoland as 
they were required to under clause 23.2. 
On 20 July 1992 the architect wrote to the developers stating, inter 
alia, that:
1. the date of completion was extended to 31 January 1992 and 
the delay certifi cate will be issued thereafter; and
2. the date of practical completion will be 1 July 1992.
On 31 July 1992 the architect issued a certifi cate of completion 
certifying that the works were practically completed on 1 July 1992.
On 4 November 1992, the architect issued a delay certifi cate 
extending the completion of the works only to 24 April 1992. 
Malayan Credit relied on the delay certifi cate to set off liquidated 
damages of about $204,000.00 from Assoland’s claim for payment 
made under the architect’s interim certifi cates of payment.
Assoland disputed the set-off. They argued that the delay 
certifi cate was invalid because the architect in granting the 
extension of time did not comply with the requirements in clause 
23.2.
The court agreed with Assoland that the one month in principle 
notice to be given by the architect was a condition precedent to 
any exercise of the architect’s powers of extension of time. 
The honourable Judicial Commissioner Goh Phai Cheng held, 
inter alia, that the architect’s failure to comply with the procedural 
requirements in Clause 23.2 meant that the purported exercise of 
power to later grant an extension of time was invalid. As such there 
was no date by which liquidated damages could be computed. 
On another time related case Aoki Corp v Lippoland (Singapore) 
Pte Ltd [23] the High Court in Singapore took a different approach. 
The parties entered into a building contract using the standard 
SIA conditions of contract. Aoki had sued on two interim payment 
certifi cates for sums totalling $992,413.80. Lippoland pleaded by 
way of set-off and counterclaim for a sum of $1,080,581.29 as 
liquidated damages by reason of delay in the completion of the 
works. The senior assistant registrar gave judgment in favour of 
Aoki in the sum claimed by them, but ordered a stay on Lippoland 
counterclaim for liquidated damages pending arbitration. Lippoland 
then appealed against both decisions of the senior assistant 
registrar and the matter was heard by Warren Khoo J (as he then 
was).
Counsel for Aoki amongst other cases, cited Assoland 
Construction Pte Ltd v Malayan Credit Properties Pte Ltd [24] 
mentioned above, where the learned judicial commissioner noted 
the two stages involved in the processing of claims for extensions 
of time, i.e. the preliminary in-principle intimation under clause 23.2 
and the fi nal decision on the quantum of extension under clause 
23.3.
In Aoki however, his Honour’s decision was simply to fi nd whether 
the failure by the architect to give his intimation in principle within 
the one-month period renders his subsequent determination 
on the extension of time invalid for the purpose of the summary 
judgement proceedings.
His Honour found that on a plain reading of clause 23.2, the 
contract did not make the in-principle intimation within the 
one-month period a condition precedent for the validity of the 
determination. It was, in his Honour’s view, of some signifi cance 
that while notifi cation by the contractor of a delay event within 28 
days of its occurrence is expressly made a condition precedent 
to an extension of time, the architect’s in-principle intimation 
within the one-month period was not expressed to be a condition 
precedent to the validity of his subsequent decision on the 
quantum. 
The reason for making the timely notifi cation by the contractor 
of a delay event a condition precedent to an extension of time 
was to enable the employer or the architect to verify the claim for 
extension and to monitor the event and its impact on the progress 
of the works. In the case of the in-principle intimation by the 
architect, his Honour was of the view that there was no compelling 
need for the draftsman to make it a condition precedent, and doing 
so would impose diffi culty for the architect to commit himself to a 
view that ‘in principle’ the contractor was entitled to an extension 
without evaluating the effect of the delay event. 
While it was the contention of Aoki that the purported extension 
of 15 days was invalid because there had been no preliminary 
in-principle intimation that the architect would grant such an 
extension, it was not suggested by them that the decision on the 
quantum of the extension was not made within the time provided 
in clause 23.3, i.e. as soon as the delay factor had ceased and it 
was possible to determine the length of extension. For the reasons 
set out above, his Honour did not think that the omission by the 
architect to give the in-principle intimation had the effect suggested 
by Aoki.
His Honour then went on to discuss inter alia, the progress 
payments and agreed that these were the lifeline of a building 
contractor’s business. It was held that Aoki were entitled to 
summary judgment for the amounts certifi ed in the interim 
certifi cates. Lippoland, on the other hand, were also entitled to 
deduct the amount of the liquidated damages consequent on the 
delay in the completion of the works. His Honour found no reason 
why Lippoland’s claim for the liquidated damages should be 
stayed.
When assessing whether a time stipulation in a construction 
contract is a condition precedent to a claim, it is necessary to 
assess the intention of the parties when negotiating the contract 
and deciding upon the procedure for making a claim. Where 
the parties have expressed a procedure and set time limits for 
submitting a claim, this will be highly persuasive that the parties 
intended that procedure to be a condition precedent.
WHETHER TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE BEING A CONDITION 
PRECEDENT
The two principles on whether the doctrines when time for giving 
notices was of the essence and a condition precedent to a claim 
for an extension of time especially where the employer has clearly 
delayed the contractor in completing the works was considered 
in Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v SA Superannuation Fund 
Investment Trust [25]. This case concerned the construction of a 
major commercial building where an extensively modifi ed version 
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of the standard Joint Construction Agreement with a contract 
sum of approximately $34 million, was entered by the parties, a 
commencement date of 15 May 1987, and a date for practical 
completion of 6 February 1989 (which was subsequently extended 
by the architect to 22 February 1989) was inserted into the 
contract.
The building consisted, in part, of pre-cambered concrete fl oors 
and a dispute arose between the parties as to whether the fl oors 
were installed and leveled in accordance with the specifi cations. 
Leighton contended that the fl oors were in compliance with the 
tolerance requirements when they were installed and that it 
was inappropriate to test the fl oors once they had settled under 
their own weight. SA claimed that the fi nish of the fl oors was 
unacceptable and the architect issued instructions to the builder to 
rectify the work.
Leighton undertook the rectifi cation work and later attempted 
to claim the works as a variation. The matter was referred to 
arbitration as required under the contract. The builder claimed for 
bonuses, variations, fi nance charges, interest and administrative 
costs in the sum of approximately $25,000,000. SA claimed 
for defective works and was awarded a sum of approximately 
$440,000 plus interest. Leighton appealed to the Supreme Court 
of South Australia on grounds (inter alia) that the arbitrator had 
erred in his construction of the notice provisions of the contract in 
relation to variations.
The contract provides for the architect under clause 6.10 with the 
right to issue variations to the contractor and makes provisions for 
the contractor to claim an adjustment to the contract sum and the 
date for practical completion; however, all variations were required 
to be authorised in writing by the architect and certifi ed by the 
proprietor before the variation work could commence. 
The contractor was required under clause 9.01 to give written 
notice to the architect within 10 working days after the delay 
occurs. Clause 15.09.04 then provides that:
1. Time shall be of the essence as regards the service by the 
builder of all notices required to be given by the builder 
pursuant to s 9 of the general conditions and this subs 15.09;
2. The service by the builder upon the proprietor and/or the 
architect of any notice or notices required to be given by the 
builder shall be conditions precedent to the substantiation and 
pursuit by the builder of any claim for an extension of time.
Thus, the contract purported that time for giving notices was of the 
essence and a condition precedent to a claim for an extension of 
time.
Leighton asserted that the architect’s instructions amount to a 
variation and that it was unable to assess the delay until the entire 
project had been completed. As a consequence, under clause 
9.01, it was not in a position to claim an extension of time until the 
end of the project.
SA however, claimed that the architect’s prior approval to the 
works was a condition precedent to any claim for a variation, and 
as such, the contractor was prohibited from making a claim. King 
CJ held:
Mr Gray contended that the arbitrator erroneously 
interpreted clause 6.09.02 as making the time for notice 
of the essence of the contract. This seems to me to be 
something of an irrelevance … The stipulation in clauses 
6.09.02 and 15.11.01 is that notice be given prior to carrying 
out the work. That is not a time stipulation. The giving of 
notice prior to commencing work is a condition precedent 
to claiming for the work as a variation. No question of time 
arises. The stipulation is mandatory and the right to claim for 
variation is contingent upon compliance. (Emphasis added)
His Honour usefully illustrated the practical difference between 
these two doctrines in relation to claims for variations or extensions 
of time. Where time is of the essence, a failure to meet that 
condition can constitute a fundamental breach of the agreement 
and allows the aggrieved party to terminate the contract. By 
comparison, where time is a condition precedent, if that mandatory 
requirement is not met the subsequent obligations cannot arise. 
In other words, in the former scenario time was destructive of 
the contract; whereas in the latter, time was constructive of the 
obligation.
DEFENCES TO TIME BARS
Time limitation clauses have always been a common feature in 
construction contracts. In determining whether they are to be 
treated as exclusion clauses it would be necessary to consider 
the intention of the parties such as whether an enforcement of 
the clause would lead to an absurdity or defeat the main object 
of the contract [26]. Where a party has failed to comply with 
the conditions as required, it may still be possible to defeat the 
time limitation clause if a defence can be made out in waiver or 
estoppel. In order to establish waiver, it will be necessary to show 
that the party seeking to rely on the exclusion clause has either 
unambiguously discarded that right or chosen to exercise an 
alternative inconsistent right.
For example, waiver on the part of the employer can arise where 
the employer waives his right to strict compliance with the terms 
of the contract, such as the time stipulation clauses [27]. When 
this occurs, it can be used as indicating a non-insistence upon a 
right either expressly stated or by conduct, where late claims in 
the past have been dealt with. That is, if the right to require strict 
compliance with a time stipulation clause is abandoned, then the 
other party is entitled to use that fact in its defence. 
Once the right has been waived, the contractor can claim that 
it had acted in reliance on the release or abandonment to its 
detriment, i.e. by not submitting its claim within the time specifi ed 
and therefore possibly putting itself in a position where its claim 
is extinguished. In the case of Lian Soon Construction Pte Ltd v 
Guan Qian Realty Pte Ltd [28] it was held by Warren Khoo J that 
although the contractor may have breach the notice provisions 
under clause 23.2 of the SIA Conditions but because the architect 
having departed from the procedures set out in the contract 
conditions the conditions precedent requirements were waived. 
To be successful in an application to time limitation, the contractor 
would need to prove that he had relied on the representation of the 
employer that it would not require the strict notice provision as a 
bar to subsequent claim by the contractor. In such circumstances, 
since the representation relates to future conduct, the contractor 
would need to show:
1. that there was an actual representation made by the 
employer; 
2. the contractor relied upon that representation; 
3. the contractor has or will suffer detriment if the employer were 
not held to the representation; and 
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4. that it would be unconscionable in the circumstances for the 
principal to act contrary to the representation.
Where the representation relates to existing facts, the estoppel 
may be grounded in common law or equity but where the 
representation relates to future conduct, the estoppel will be 
promissory estoppel and it will be necessary to establish that it 
would be unconscionable to rely on the time limitation. Typically, 
representations made by an employer that it will not rely on a time 
limitation will be promises as to future conduct, and a claim of 
estoppel may be made in equity. The courts usually look primarily 
at the conduct of the party to determine whether that party’s 
conduct could form the basis of a claim that the time limitation 
should not apply. In establishing estoppel, the party seeking to 
rely on the time limitation must show that they had relied on the 
representation made by the other party to its detriment. 
Detriment may be caused where the contractor had relied on 
an assumption brought about by the words or conduct of the 
employer which, if denied, would result in injustice. For example, 
if the employer says “don’t worry, just get the job done as soon as 
possible”, then the contractor may not have to comply within the 
time line required. If that assumption is denied by the employer, 
then the detriment to the contractor is obvious and demonstrable. 
Unfortunately, even an assertion of waiver may be required by the 
terms of the contract to be in writing.
The issue of unconscionability was considered in the case of 
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher [29] where the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel was extended to the enforcement of voluntary 
promises that a departure from the basic assumption underlying 
the transaction between the parties must be unconscionable. In 
this case, Maher (the “landlord”) entered into negotiations with 
Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd (a potential “tenant”) to discuss 
the tenant’s specifi cation which among other things included the 
demolition of an existing building and erecting a new one to meet 
the needs of the tenant. It was established during the trial that 
major negotiations took place in the fi rst two weeks of November 
1983 to fi nalise the lease and the negotiations went into overdrive 
due to approaching year-end holidays and the tight schedule 
imposed on the landlord to complete the new building. After further 
discussions which included a request of extension of time by the 
landlord, it was agreed that the new building will be available 
for fi tting out by 15 January and completed by 5 February 1984. 
The lease was then executed by the landlord and returned to the 
tenant’s lawyers. The landlord then proceeded with the demolition 
works until 19 January 1984 when they were notifi ed by their 
lawyers that the tenant’s lawyers had written to inform that the 
tenant did not intend to proceed with the lease. By then extensive 
works had already been carried out on site with the knowledge of 
the tenant.
The court found that the appellant (tenant) was under an obligation 
to communicate with the respondents within a reasonable time 
after receiving the executed counterpart deed and certainly when 
it learnt that the respondent (landlord) was proceeding with the 
demolition of the existing building. It was held that the appellant 
was estopped from denying the existence of a binding contract. 
They have to choose whether to complete the contract or to warn 
the respondents that it had not yet decided upon the course it 
would take.
Unconscionability was also considered in the case of Abigroup 
Contractors Pty Ltd v Sydney Catchment Authority [30] where the 
contractor had alleged that a report produced by the employer 
was found to be ambiguous. The employer claimed that the 
contractor’s acceptance of the report was itself a representation 
from which the contractor was estopped from resiling. However, 
the court found that since the contractor was induced to give the 
representation by the unconscionable conduct of the employer, the 
contractor’s representation that it accepted the report was not itself 
unconscionable.
Generally, the equitable approach had prevailed and time will only 
be of the essence where it is expressly stated to be so or where 
it may reasonably be implied. Factors such as the presence of 
liquidated damages tend to imply that parties did not anticipate 
time stipulations to be conditions. 
An intermediate term lies somewhere between a condition and a 
warranty and have also been described as “innominate” terms. 
Whether a term is intermediate in character will depend largely 
on the construction of the contract and the intention of the parties 
as expressed in the contract [31], and its breach will give rise to 
a right to claim damages, but the right to terminate the contract 
will depend on the nature of the breach, its foreseeability and 
consequences. However, as a general proposition, where an 
express term is found not to be a condition it may be presumed 
[32] to be intermediate in character unless the parties have clearly 
expressed an intention that the term is a warranty, particularly 
in cases where the term is capable of being breached in various 
ways [33].
Warranties have been regarded as not a vital term in a contract. 
A breach would only provide the aggrieved party to damages 
and does not permit the innocent party to repudiate the contract. 
For example, where a contractor fi nishes the project late it would 
amount to a breach of warranty and the employer is entitled to 
liquidated damages but not termination of the contract.
CONCLUSION 
A review of existing literature and case law makes it clear that 
time stipulations in construction contracts may be conditions, 
intermediate (innominate) terms or warranties. It is important for 
contractors to recognise that where time stipulation is a condition, 
a failure to meet the specifi ed time will be a fundamental breach 
of the agreement. At common law, time is deemed to be of the 
essence of a contract, however, a more liberal approach has been 
adopted in equity. By asking for performance when the promisee is 
guilty of delay is to ask the promisor to do something that he or she 
never agreed to.
The key message, therefore, is to ensure that the parties’ project 
managers keep a watchful eye on events that might be subject 
to time limits and make certain (to the extent possible) that all 
claims are submitted within the time frames specifi ed, as failure to 
do so would be expensive. It would perhaps be good practice for 
contractors to observe keeping good, orderly and clear records of 
communications, diary entries, minutes of meetings and the like, 
which will assist them in building a claim that may be time barred 
if it emerges later that waiver, estoppel or unconscionability could 
be proven.
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